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I. Introduction: The Root of the Fifth Amendment 
The right to acquire and possess property has long been established, and 
since, reaffirmed, as a right fundamental to our society.
1
 In fact, during the 
time leading up to our present Constitution, hundreds of amendments were 
proposed.
2
 Of those, the Fifth Amendment, which included some indicia of 
protection of private property, survived the cut
3
 and joined nine other 
amendments that would come to be known collectively as the Bill of 
Rights. A property owner naturally expects that he will be permitted to do 
as he pleases with his own property. After all, few individuals purchase a 
house with an expectation that someone else will dictate the color the fence 
will be painted or expecting that someone can prevent them from 
converting the home into a Bed and Breakfast. 
Nevertheless, the rights and expectations associated with property 
ownership constantly face opposition. Where property rights in general are 
recognized and defined by the government, competing interests between 
state and local governments and property owners continue to produce 
                                                                                                                 
  J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Oklahoma College of Law; B.A. 2015, Texas 
Tech University. My deepest gratitude to the board members of the Oil and Gas, Natural 
Resources, and Energy Journal for their guidance throughout the process of crafting this 
note. 
 1. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524-25 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Corfield v. Croyell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
 2. Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding of the So-
Called “Takings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1279 (2002). 
 3. See id. at 1278-87. 
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conflict and litigation, particularly when a government action or regulation 
prevents an owner of real property from using his property in the manner he 
so desires. For example, a landowner’s interest in building a house in the 
shape of a pyramid might conflict with the local government’s interest in 
safeguarding property values in the neighborhood.
4
 Such competing 
interests most commonly manifest themselves in the context of zoning and 
land-use regulations. 
Despite property ownership being theoretically fundamental, the 
practical protections of this right have proven to be thin. When a zoning or 
land-use regulation is enacted that dictates what property owners can and 
cannot do with their property, courts have accorded substantial deference to 
such zoning and regulatory decisions. As such, landowners have continued 
to seek to enforce the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. However, 
due to the wide deference courts have chosen to bestow on state and local 
governments, landowners continue to find certain rights associated with 
property all but taken. 
This note will first examine the law surrounding the takings clause as it 
existed prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Murr v. Wisconsin.
5
 After 
summarizing the case and recounting the Court’s decision, this note will 
analyze the Court’s opinion and explain how the Court’s addition to takings 
jurisprudence was necessary. This note will then discuss why the particular 
method chosen nevertheless failed due to the Court’s circular application of 
its new-found test to the issue presented. 
II. The Law Before the Case 
The Fifth Amendment encompasses various rights, which most 
commonly include the right against self-incrimination and the right against 
“double jeopardy.”
6
 The so-called “takings” clause also finds its home in 
the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment, along with the other first ten 
amendments, originally applied only to the federal government. However, 
almost all of them, including the Fifth Amendment, have since been held to 




                                                                                                                 
 4. See State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970). 
 5. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 7. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) [hereinafter 
Penn Central]. 
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 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no “private 
property shall be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
8
 The 
extent of this protection has stirred up much litigation and debate. When a 
property owner asserts a takings claim, the following issues commonly 
arise: 1) whether the government’s purported use constitutes a “public 
use”;
9
 whether the government has paid “just” compensation;
10
 3) whether 
the property has in fact been “taken” within the meaning of the 
Constitution; and 4) issues regarding the relevant property at issue.
11
 The 
manner in which the Court resolves these issues depends on whether the 
property owner alleges a categorical taking or a regulatory taking. 
A. Categorical Takings 
Categorical takings overtly fall within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment’s takings clause. These are also referred to as per se takings. 
Such takings relevant for the purposes of this note consist of permanent 
physical fixtures
12
 and regulations that effectively deprive an owner of “all 
economically beneficial use[]” of his or her land.
13
 For example, the Court 
held in Lucas that where a regulation enacted in 1988 prevented a 
landowner from building permanent residential structures on two residential 
lots he had purchased two years before the regulation’s enactment,
14
 and 
where the trial court found that the property “had been rendered valueless 
as a result,”
15
 a taking had occurred requiring just compensation.
16
 
Therefore, under a categorical takings analysis, if the governmental action 
amounts to a physical occupation on private property or if it effectively 
eliminates all economic use of the property, such action is held to be a 





                                                                                                                 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 9. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 10. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
 11. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (failing to reach the issue 
because the landowner did not raise it in the petition for certiorari); see also Penn Central, 
438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 12. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1982). 
 13. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 14. Id. at 1003. 
 15. Id. at 1020. 
 16. Id. at 1019. 
 17. See id.; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426. 
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B. Regulatory Takings 
Initially, the takings clause was thought to extend only to physical 
takings.
18
 However, the Court later established that a taking can be 
effectuated in ways that do not necessarily involve physical occupancy.
19
 
Specifically, land use and zoning regulations, though typically viewed as 
permissible exercises of police power, can also run afoul of the Fifth 
Amendment’s takings clause.
20
 The Court held in Pennsylvania Coal that 
“while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if [the] regulation goes 
too far[,] it will be recognized as a taking,”
21
 otherwise known as a 




In Pennsylvania Coal, a coal company conveyed surface rights to a piece 
of property, but it expressly retained the right to mine coal under the 
property.
23
 The grantees further waived all claims for damages that might 
have arisen from the mining.
24
 Decades later, the state passed an Act that 
prohibited mining coal in such a way that would “cause the subsidence 
of . . . any structure used as a human habitation.”
25
 The company’s mining 
activity had such effect, and the grantees sought to enjoin the mining on the 
grounds that the mining violated the Act.
26
 However, the Court found that 
the Act effectively destroyed the company’s property and the contractual 
rights it expressly reserved.
27
 Therefore, the Court held that applying the 
Act to the case at hand amounted to a taking.
28
 
After this revelation, a taking may present itself in three ways: 1) 
permanent physical occupancy;
29
 2) a regulation depriving a landowner of 
all economically beneficial use of his or her property;
30




                                                                                                                 
 18. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014. 
 19. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Coal]. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. at 415. 
 22. Id. at 414-15. 
 23. Id. at 412. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 412-13. 
 27. Id. at 413. 
 28. Id. at 415. 
 29. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426. 
 30. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
 31. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2425-26. 
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Nevertheless, even if a regulation has not deprived the landowner of all 
economically beneficial use of his or her property, all is not lost for the 
owner. Beyond categorical takings, determining whether one’s property has 
been taken under the meaning of the Fifth Amendment is not a simple 
task.
32
 The Court has laid down a set of factors to consider when 
determining whether a regulatory action nevertheless constitutes a taking.
33
 
In Penn Central, New York City enacted a Landmark Preservation Law 
which required prior approval before making alterations to property that 
had been designated as a landmark.
34
 The Grand Central Terminal had been 
so designated.
35
 Several months after its designation, owners of the 
Terminal entered into an agreement with a development company whereby 
the company would construct an office building above the Terminal.
36
 Due 
to the Terminal’s landmark designation, the owners and the company 
sought approval of two construction plans; the Commission denied both 
plans.
37
 The owners subsequently sued, claiming a Fifth Amendment 
takings violation and sought, inter alia, injunctive relief.
38
 
There, the Court had to determine “whether the application of New York 
City’s Landmark Preservation Law to the parcel of land occupied by the 
Grand Central Terminal ha[d] ‘taken’ the owner’s property.”
39
 To 
determine whether the preservation law effectuated a taking, the Court 
introduced three factors. The Court considered: 1) “the economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant”; 2) “the extent to which the regulation . . . 
interfere[d] with investment-backed expectations”; and, 3) “the character of 
the governmental action.”
40
 As to the “character” analysis, the Court 
determined whether the “interference with property can be characterized as 
a physical invasion by the government” or simply as interference that 
“arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good.”
41
 These factors make up the 
test courts apply when presented with a regulatory takings claim. Therefore, 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123. 
 33. Id. at 124. 
 34. Id. at 112-13. 
 35. Id. at 115. 
 36. Id. at 116. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 119. 
 39. Id. at 107. 
 40. Id. at 124. 
 41. Id. 
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if a state action does not amount to a per se taking, the case will be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis under the test set forth in Penn Central. 
Notwithstanding its developments, takings jurisprudence prior to Murr v. 
Wisconsin was not sufficient to guide the resolution of the underlying issue 
presented therein.
42
 As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his Murr dissent, the 
two methods of inquiry for regulatory takings “presuppose[d] that the 
relevant ‘private property’ [had] already been identified.”
43
 Therefore, Murr 
presented an opportunity for a long-overdue resolution to what has become 
a dispositive preliminary issue. 
III. Statement of the Case 
A. The Burdensome Regulations 
The land at issue in Murr is located along the Lower St. Croix River in 
Troy, Wisconsin.
44
 Due to its aesthetic and tourism value, the St. Croix 
River had been designated for federal protection in 1972.
45
 In an effort to 
comply with the federal designation, Wisconsin enacted several regulations 
regulating land use and development in the area surrounding the River.
46
 
Pursuant to these regulations, lots could not be treated as separate building 
sites unless “the lot [wa]s in separate ownership” or “the lot by itself or in 
combination with an adjacent lot . . . [was] under common ownership . . . 
[and] ha[d] at least one acre of [buildable land] area.”
47
 However, the 
regulations included an exception for presently existing substandard lots, 
known as a grandfather clause, which made an exception for “substandard 
lots” that were not under common ownership.
48
 In addition to the minimum 
“project area” requirement, a provision which operated as a merger 
provision applied to adjacent lots under common ownership; it provided 
that such lots could neither be sold nor developed if they did not meet the 
size requirement for developable land.
49
 Owners of substandard lots could 




                                                                                                                 
 42. See 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (2017). 
 43. Id. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 1940. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (citing Wis. Admin. Code NR § 118.08). 
 48. Id. (citing Wis. Admin. Code NR § 118.08(4)(a)(1)). 
 49. Id. (citing Wis. Admin. Code NR § 118(4)(a)(2)). 
 50. Id. (citing Wis. Admin. Code NR § 118.09(4)(b)). 
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B. The Facts 
The land at issue in Murr consisted of two adjacent lots, known as Lot E 
and Lot F, located along the St. Croix River.
51
 The lots are described as 
follows: 
The lots have the same topography. A steep bluff cuts through 
the middle of each, with level land suitable for development 
above the bluff and next to the water below it. The line dividing 
Lot E from Lot F runs from the riverfront to the far end of the 
property, crossing the blufftop along the way. Lot E has 
approximately 60 feet of river frontage, and Lot F has 
approximately 100 feet. Though each lot is approximately 1.25 
acres in size, because of the waterline and the steep bank[,] they 
each have less than one acre of land suitable for development. 
Even when combined, the lots' buildable land area is only 0.98 
acres due to the steep terrain.
52
 
The petitioners’ parents previously owned both lots and had held the lots 
under separate ownership.
53
 The family plumbing company held title to Lot 
F, and the parents held title to Lot E in their names.
54
 A recreational cabin 
existed on Lot F,
55
 and Lot E remained vacant.
56
 The Murr siblings—two 
sisters and two brothers—later obtained title to the two lots from their 
parents, receiving title to Lot F in 1994 and title to Lot E in 1995.
57
 Upon 
obtaining title to Lot E, the adjacent lots came under common ownership.
58
 
Due to the substandard nature of each lot, this triggered the so-called 
“merger” provision which effectively merged both lots and purported to 
treat them as a single parcel.
59
 
As time passed, the siblings wanted to move the cabin on Lot F to a 
different portion of the lot,
60
 so they decided to sell “Lot E to fund the 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1941. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 4, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) 
(No. 15-214), 2016 WL 1459199, at *4. 
 57. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940. 
 58. Id. at 1940-41. 
 59. Id. at 1941. 
 60. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018





 They sought variances from the St. Croix County Board of 
Adjustment, including a variance to allow the separate sale or use of the 
lots, but the Board denied their requests.
62
 
C. Procedural History 
Frustrated with their inability to proceed with their improvement plan, 
the petitioners sued, claiming the regulations amounted to a regulatory 
taking of Lot E.
63
 They argued that the regulations “depriv[ed] them of all, 
or practically all, of the use of Lot E because [it] cannot be [separately] sold 
or developed.”
64
 The circuit court found that no taking occurred, reasoning 
that, notwithstanding the regulations, the “petitioners retained ‘several 
available options for the use and enjoyment of their property’” and the 
property’s value was not sufficiently diminished to amount to a taking.
65
 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the property as a 
whole consisted of both Lots E and F together,
66
 because the zoning laws 
were already in effect when they acquired the property, the petitioners did 
not have a reasonable expectation to use the lots separately,
67
 and, agreeing 
with the circuit court, “the regulations diminished the property’s combined 
value by less than ten percent.”
68
 
D. Issue Presented 
This case presented the issue of whether, under the parcel as a whole 
rule, Lots E and F together or Lot E alone was the relevant “property” to be 




A. Majority: The Whole Lot of It 
To resolve the issue before it, the Court made two inquiries: 1) what is 
the private property at issue; and 2) has the property been “taken” so as to 
require just compensation?
70
 The Court began its analysis by 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1941-42. 
 68. Id. at 1942. 
 69. Id. at 1943-44. 
 70. Id. 
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acknowledging that the resolution of the question presented “may be 
outcome determinative.”
71
 Realizing that there are no specific guidelines to 
identify the relevant parcel, the Court reflected on prior decisions and noted 




First, the Court noted that it does not “limit the parcel . . . to the portion 
of property targeted by the challenged regulation,” referencing its decisions 
in Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierra.
73
 This concept has evolved into the 
“parcel as a whole” rule.
74
 The second concept is the Court’s continued 
caution against “the view that property rights under the takings clause 
should be coextensive with those under state law.”
75
 Per this concept, the 
Court recognized the danger in allowing state law to define completely 
one’s property rights as they exist under the takings clause—particularly in 
ways that would yield results detrimental to an owner’s investment-backed 
expectations, which the takings clause has been held to protect.
76
 
Noting that “no single consideration can supply the exclusive test for 
determining the denominator,” and paring this reality with a couple of 
familiar concepts, the Court introduced three new factors to help determine 
the denominator.
77
 Those factors are: 1) the treatment of the land under 
state and local law; 2) the physical characteristics of the land; and 3) the 
prospective value of the regulated land.
78
 According to the Court, the 
ultimate goal of this inquiry is to determine “whether reasonable 
expectations about property ownership would lead a landowner to 




For the first factor, the Court directed that the treatment of the land under 
state and local law be given “substantial weight” with particular attention to 
“how it is bounded or divided.”
80
 Under the same inquiry, the Court further 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 1944. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 331 (2002); Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 130). 
 74. Id. at 1952 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“We rejected that narrow definition of 
‘property’ at issue, concluding that the correct unit of analysis was the owner’s ‘rights in the 
parcel as a whole.’”) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31). 
 75. Id. at 1944. 
 76. Id. at 1952. 
 77. Id. at 1945. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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imputes some knowledge to a prospective landowner of the restrictions and 
regulations affecting his or her subsequent use of the property.
81
 
Applying this factor, the Court quickly dismissed the solutions to 
determining the denominator proposed by both the State and the 
petitioners.
82
 It then determined that this factor supported the property being 
treated as one parcel because state law merged Lots E and F, the merger 
provision was valid, and the petitioners voluntarily subjected themselves to 
the merger provision by bringing the lots under common ownership.
83
 
Guiding the second factor, the Court identified the relevant 
characteristics of the land to include “the physical relationship of any 
distinguishable tracts, the parcel’s topography, the surrounding human and 
ecological environment[, and whether] the property is located in an area . . . 
subject to, or likely to become subject to, environmental or other 
regulation.”
84
 Here, the Court also determined that treating the lots as a 
single parcel was appropriate.
85
 The Court specifically pointed out that the 
lots’ rough terrain and narrow shape and the land’s location along the St. 
Croix River made it reasonable for Petitioners to “expect their range of 
potential uses to be limited” and to “anticipate[] regulations affecting the 
enjoyment of their property, as the [area] was . . . regulated . . . under state, 
federal, and local law long before Petitioners possessed the land.”
86
 
When applying the third, final factor, courts must “assess the value of the 
property under the challenged regulation, [while paying] special attention to 
the effect of burdened land on the value of other holdings.”
87
 Here, the 
Court determined the “prospective value Lot E [brought] to Lot F 
support[ed] considering the two as one parcel,”
88
 and the benefits of using 
both lots as a whole mitigated the prohibition on selling Lot E.
89
 
Additionally, if the Murrs sold the lots together, the value of the combined 
lots would be $698,300 whereas, if sold individually, Lot F’s value would 
be $373,000 and Lot E’s value would be $40,000
90
—a difference of over 
$285,000. After applying each factor, the Court determined that the 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1946-47. 
 83. Id. at 1948. 
 84. Id. at 1945-46 (citation omitted). 
 85. Id. at 1948. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1946. 
 88. Id. at 1948. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1949. 
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appropriate denominator for a regulatory takings claim was Lots E and F 
together as a single parcel.
91
 
After establishing the denominator, the Court then analyzed whether a 
regulatory taking had occurred. The Court first found that the Murrs had not 
been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the property under 
Lucas because “[t]hey [could still] use the property for residential 
purposes.”
92
 The Court then examined the Murrs’ takings claim under the 
Penn Central test. Pointing to the appraisal values, the Court determined 
that the economic impact of the regulation was not severe.
93
 Furthermore, 
the fact that the regulation existed prior to their acquisition of both lots 
negated any claim that they reasonably expected to use the lots separately.
94
 
Finally, the Court determined that “the governmental action was a 
reasonable land-use regulation [in an] effort to preserve the river and 
surrounding land.”
95
 After applying the various tests and factors, the Court 




Three justices refused to join the majority’s reasoning.
97
 The dissent 
opined that by introducing “an elaborate test” to define the property at 
issue, the majority departed from its longstanding tradition of looking to 
state law to define such property.
98
 The dissent further asserted that, when 
determining the denominator, the majority considered criteria that “should 
[actually] be considered when deciding if a regulation constitutes a 
‘taking.’”
99
 In doing so, the Fifth Amendment’s protection against takings 
and its effectiveness as a check on the government is undermined.
100
 
Because the denominator is chosen based on reasonableness, state 
governments now have an incentive to seek aggregation of legally distinct 
property in the context of litigation.
101
 The state will now have two bites at 
the constitutional apple when a court makes a takings inquiry.
102
 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. at 1948. 
 92. Id. at 1949. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1948-50. 
 96. Id. at 1949. 
 97. Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1954. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 1954-55. 
 102. See id. at 1955. 
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The threshold issue presented in Murr by no means came as a surprise to 
the Court; this “denominator” issue has manifested itself to the Court in the 
past.
103
 Until now, the Court has been able to avoid it. However, through 
Murr, the issue was resurrected and the Court finally made an attempt to 
resolve it. In doing so, the Court introduced something necessary but used it 
in a manner that was harmful to one of the few meaningful roots in which 
property guarantees are grounded. 
A. The Necessary End 
A method to aid the determination of the relevant parcel at issue was 
long overdue. The Court has previously cautioned against relying on state 
law alone to define property rights under the takings clause.
104
 However, 
beyond this, no meaningful guidance had been offered. Therefore, the 
Court’s decision to enumerate precise considerations to weigh alongside 
state law was nothing short of necessary to avoid arbitrary inquiries into 
defining the relevant parcel and to ultimately avoid misguided applications 
of takings jurisprudence when the relevant parcel is in dispute. 
However, in his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts interpreted the majority’s 
test as a deviation from the Court’s long-standing tradition of defining the 
property according to state law.
105
 Under his reasoning, he would have the 
Court look only to state law to define the property at issue.
106
 However, 
such limitation is not a sound solution to resolving disputes regarding state 
laws which purport to redefine property boundaries. Furthermore, such 
strict and exclusive reliance would open the door to uncontrolled regulatory 
action which would threaten to reduce fundamental property rights to a 
mere theory. As the majority noted, merger provisions that would be 
completely unreasonable can exist.
107
 The Court used the example of a 
regulation purporting to consolidate nonadjacent property under common 
ownership.
108
 Thus, if the Court strictly limited itself to defining property 
based on state law alone, it would find itself upholding absurd regulatory 
provisions purporting to bind remote tracts of land. Furthermore, the 
dissent’s confidence that any “gamesmanship” or “obvious attempts to alter 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 104. See id. 
 105. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 1945. 
 108. Id. 
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the legal landscape in anticipation of a lawsuit [would not] be difficult 
to . . . disarm”
109
 is void of a non-arbitrary explanation of how the Court 
would do so. Nevertheless, though the Court heeded such a necessary call, 
it did so in a way that resulted in more harm than good. 
B. The Evil Means 
On its face, the Court’s first factor seems harmless. Including the state’s 
treatment of certain property when determining the denominator is the 
logical thing to do considering that property—the group of rights one has in 
relation to a certain thing,
110
 is a matter of state law. Furthermore, even the 
dissent acknowledged that the Court traditionally looks to state law to 
define the boundaries of parcels of land,
111
 which makes such consideration 
consistent with precedent. 
However, the extent to which the Court relied on state law to identify the 
denominator was circular. It assumed the question for which an answer was 
sought and bypassed the inquiry that needed to be made, which was 
whether the challenged state regulation resulted in a taking of the Murrs’ 
property.
112
 Though the laws currently in place at the time the owner 
acquires the property may provide some insight into the reasonableness of a 
landowner’s anticipated uses of his property, such deferential reliance on 
those laws assumes that they are both reasonable and presently in accord 
with the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, when that law is attacked for running 
afoul of the Fifth Amendment, it is circular, then, to allow this one-third of 
the overall inquiry to be so substantially determinate of the ultimate 
outcome. 
When the regulation purporting to define the property at issue is the very 
regulation being challenged, other indicia of state law should be lent more 
weight than that which was accorded by the Court. Specifically, traditional 
references to state law defining parcels by the metes and bounds, the legal 
distinctions of the land, whether the owner paid taxes on each parcel 
individually or collectively, and the length of time between acquisition of 
the first and second parcels, just to name a few. These things are also 
capable of speaking to an owner’s reasonable expectations regarding 
whether his property will be treated as separate tracts or a single parcel. 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 1951 (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). 
 111. Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 112. See id. at 1941. 
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Additionally, the manner in which the owner treats the property 
immediately after and during possession—whether he himself treated them 
as separate or as single parcels—is another insightful indicator of the 
owner’s expectations regarding his property. Here, the Murrs’ parents first 
purchased Lot F and later purchased Lot E, which remained undeveloped, 
and they held Lot E for investment purposes until they could decide what to 
do with it.
113
 They then passed this same expectation to their children who 
held on to Lot E for another decade before deciding to make good on the 
investment and seeking to sell it for the benefit of Lot F.
114
 Rather than 
crediting this as an expectation of using the lots separately, the Court 
deemed these facts as mere evidence of knowledge of the regulations and, 
thus, an unreasonable expectation of using the lots separately,
115
 never mind 
how the owners objectively manifested their expectation. 
Furthermore, the manner in which the Court applied the second factor 
was, again, harmful to landowners and helpful to states. The Court decided 
that physical characteristics of property can put an owner of adjacent 
parcels on notice that his property might be subject to regulation, and that 
his use or enjoyment of the land might be in some way limited.
116
 Under the 
Court’s reasoning, the fact that some regulation might apply to property in a 
certain area is somehow sufficient to plant in an owner’s mind that, 
specifically, his two properties will be treated as one; thus, the anticipation 
of regulation in general equates an expectation of a specific type of 
regulation. Not only is such conclusion far-reaching, but it is also 
inconsistent with the regulations in place affecting the property at issue in 
Murr. The regulations expressly allowed an owner of a substandard lot in 
the regulated area to nevertheless develop or sell it despite the physical 
characteristics of the land.
117
 
Furthermore, when setting out to define the relevant property, 
considering the prospective value of the regulated property is destined to 
yield unfair results for a landowner similarly situated to the Murr siblings. 
The Court credited the enhanced value of both lots together as evidence of 
the reasonableness of considering both parcels as one lot. However, relying 
on such a “two-is-better-than-one” result might be a reasonable decision if 
one’s goal was economic gain, but it does not equate a reasonable 
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expectation that two adjacent lots under common ownership would be 
treated as one, especially if a property owner uses the two lots for separate 
purposes. Conversely, simply because two parcels would be worth more or 
retain approximately the same value if they were treated as a single parcel 
does not make an owner’s expectation of maintaining separate uses of the 
lots unreasonable. To hold as such places a property owner’s “destiny” 
regarding his property into the hands of the government, a gesture which, as 
the Court noted, the government would be eager to accept.
118
 Furthermore, 
as the dissent noted, examining any impact on property’s value comes into 
play when determining whether there has been a taking;
119
 this inquiry 
arises only after the relevant property has been identified.
120
 Inviting value 
in the equation twice steepens the slope of the already uphill battle that 
petitioners seeking to bring a takings claim must face. 
C. Where Do We Draw the Line? 
The precise test chosen for determining the relevant parcel blurs the line 
between a denominator inquiry and a takings analysis. In fact, there can be 
no line between the two. As Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent noted, the Court 
effectively applied a takings analysis to define the relevant property at 
issue.
121
 For example, the test’s third factor—the prospective value of the 
land—not only borrows from takings jurisprudence, but it effectively 
determines the outcome of the first factor in takings analysis—the 
economic impact of the regulation—before the Court has even undergone 
the inquiry. If the Court determines that the prospective value of the 
regulated land weighs in favor of assigning the broader definition to the 
relevant parcel, then the logical effect of that outcome carries over to 
takings analysis. Otherwise, a court could find that the prospective value of 
the land supports a reasonable expectation for two distinct parcels being 
treated as one, but yet determine that the economic impact regarding the 
same property is so detrimental to the owner’s reasonable property 
expectations that it amounts to a taking and requires just compensation. One 
cannot conceive such an unsound result. 
In addition to the similar purposes for which the Court examines value 
and economic impact, the line is further blurred by the overall goals in 
conducting each analysis. Each inquiry seeks to ascertain what an owner 
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reasonably expected to get out of the property and whether applying the 
challenged regulation to the owner undermines his property expectation.
122
 
The overlap is further evidenced in the Court’s brief analysis into whether a 
taking had occurred.
123
 After applying its new-found test, the Court simply 
imported its findings from determining the relevant parcel. In just four 
sentences, the Court held that the Murrs had not suffered a taking for the 




Through its decision in Murr, the Court employed evil means to reach a 
necessary end and thereby made it nearly impossible to draw the line 
between solving a denominator issue and resolving a takings claim. Sound 
guidance was necessary to answer a both simple and difficult question. 
However, the manner in which the Court applied its denominator test 
accomplished the very thing the Court purported to reject. Though the 
Court expressly rejected solving the denominator issue based on state law 
alone, its test functionally does just that. Additionally, the second and third 
factors were applied in such a way to ascertain whether the state’s position 
regarding the denominator is justified, which makes these factors in 
addition to state law merely illusory. 
The deck remains stacked against the landowner, with each aspect of his 
claim being viewed in the light most favorable to the government, not once, 
but twice. Under the Court’s new test, a victory of the battle effectively 
guarantees a victory of the war, and the Murr decision rigs each battle in 
such a way that continues to favor states. The Court continues to 
demonstrate that the constitutional assurance in the Fifth Amendment that 
private property will not be taken without compensation is nothing more 
than a thin, last resort guarantee. With each new or first impression issue, 
courts will continue to be deferential to states when citizens’ property rights 
are at stake, requiring states to satisfy only a reasonableness standard for 
invading a fundamental right. Takings jurisprudence as a whole has now 
become a blur and will remain as such until the Court takes back its failed 
attempt to put the denominator issue to rest. 
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